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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION*
FRANCIS A. BOYLE**

The public record reveals that when the Ford administration left
office, approximately three-quarters of the terms of the SALT II
Treaty had been negotiated.' Shortly after his inauguration, President
Carter unilaterally called for, inter alia, substantial qualitative limitations on, and quantitative reductions in, land-based intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) systems, much to the astonishment of the Soviet Union.2 Such cuts would have redounded to the strategic disadvantage of the Soviets because of their preponderant reliance on
ICBMs. In contrast to America's more evenly balanced "triad" of strategic nuclear warheads dispersed between heavy bombers (27%), submarines (50%) and ICBMs (23%), the Soviets have about 72% of their
strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, 23% in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 5% on strategic nuclear bombers.3 This
Carter initiative, in effect, renounced the 1974 Vladivostok agreement'
concluded between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev on
the basic principles for future SALT negotiations: namely, an equal
overall aggregate ceiling of 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and a sublimit of 1320 multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems for each
side. As a result, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's mission to Moscow
with President Carter's suggestions at the end of March 1977 failed.'
The Soviets insisted upon a return to Vladivostok in order to continue
the negotiations. Carter eventually had to give in, withdraw his proposals and return to the Vladivostok consensus. But this blunder had sideCopyright © 1983 Francis A. Boyle. All rights reserved.
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law in Champaign.
The author wishes to note that the research for the following article was concluded
by June 3, 1983.
1. See, e.g., 3 The SALT II Treaty: HearingsBefore the Committee on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1979).
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
3. World Armaments and Disarmament, 1982 S.I.P.R.I.Y.B. 269 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI].
4. See Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok Nov. 24,
1974, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 23, 1974, at 879. See also Joint Communique
Signed at Vladivostok Nov. 24, 1974, reprinted in id.
5. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
**
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tracked negotiations on the SALT II Treaty for several months.6 No
serious progress was made on SALT II until the Fall of 1977.
About one year later, SALT negotiations were again set back by
six months because of the badly timed decision taken by the Carter
administration to grant diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The decision was announced in December of 1978
and was to be effective January 1, 1979.' This act represented the culmination of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's "grand strategy" of establishing a three-way "balance of power" between the
United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
By instituting an American relationship with the PRC, Kissinger
sought to generate a new source of leverage over the Soviet Union that
could be exploited on numerous other issues: e.g., the Viet Nam War,
detente and SALT. It was a textbook example of the practical application of the Machiavellian theory of power politics on a global scale in
the nuclear age. Yet, because of Carter's decision to "play the China
card" at that time, it was not until late June 1979 that SALT II was
finally signed in Vienna,8 a moment too perilously close to the beginning of the 1980 Presidential campaign. This hiatus meant that SALT
II would inevitably become hostage to the vicissitudes of American
electoral rites and could not conceivably be evaluated by an objective
and dispassionate analysis of its merits alone. Or to phrase this proposition more precisely, the ratification of SALT II was ultimately and
quite properly recommended on its merits alone by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in a 9 to 6 vote, subject to certain reservations, understandings and declarations, 9 but never came to fruition because of political reasons that were totally extraneous to the treaty's
intrinsic value as an arms control measure.
As it turned out, SALT II actually accelerated the pace of the nuclear arms race considerably. Part of the price Carter chose to pay for
approval of SALT II by his Joint Chiefs of Staff was the decision, announced in September 1979,10 to deploy a land-based MX missile system in a "racetrack" basing mode, later changed to a "dragstrip" pro6. See News Conference held by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Geneva on May
21, 1977, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 13, 1977, at 628; Joint Communique, reprinted in id. at 633.
7. See East Asia: U.S. Normalizes Relations with the People's Republic of China,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 25.
8. S. EXEC. Doc. No. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-45 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SALT
II]. See also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No.
AGREEMENT (June 18, 1979).
9. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, EXECuTIVE REPORT ON THE SALT II
TREATY, EXEC. REP. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
10. MX Missile System, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1979, at 25.

12B, SALT II
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posal-both of which were equally absurd." The "racetrack/dragstrip"
basing modes were founded upon the dubious assumption that the Soviets would reciprocate by building a similar semi-fixed mobile ICBM
system of their own in order to permit "adequate verification" for the
purpose of future arms control agreements. But this further assumed
that the Soviets had a genuine commitment to "adequate verification"
in the first place and, more importantly, that they were willing to commit such a vast expenditure of funds to replicate such a cost-inefficient
system. Although the United States economy might be strong enough
to sustain such massive waste, the Soviet economy definitely is not.
The Soviets will, in all probability, develop a cost-efficient land-based
fully mobile ICBM system that might not be "adequately verifiable"-for example, on railroad cars. If so, then the racetrack/dragstrip
MX would have proven to be an economic, strategic and environmental
folly. Moreover, despite the Pentagon's contrary arguments, the Soviets could MIRV their missiles more cheaply than the United States
could build additional racetracks/dragstrips. Further, a racetrack/dragstrip MX shelter would not have been hardened; it could, therefore, be
taken out by only one Soviet reentry vehicle (RV), not the standard
two. "2' Thus, any alleged United States ICBM "vulnerability" problem
would still not have been solved by a racetrack/dragstrip MX. Consequently, President Reagan was quite correct to abandon the Carter administration's harebrained basing mode for the MX. Fortunately, the
Reagan administration's plan to substitute an equally ridiculous
mode-the "closely spaced basing" system, more popularly known as
the "dense-pack"-was soundly rejected by the Scowcroft Commission
Report, and President Reagan quickly endorsed the findings of the
Commission."8
The "racetrack" MX decision was reached shortly after the
Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna for the signature of SALT II. It
destroyed whatever good will, trust and momentum for the future that
had been generated there, and poisoned the atmosphere for the proposed SALT III negotiations concerning theater nuclear forces in Europe. With its ten to fourteen MIRVs, each possessing near pinpoint
accuracy, the land-based MX threatened to exercise a profoundly destabilizing impact on the strategic nuclear balance of terror between
the two superpowers. It purported to provide the United States with
11. See Feld & Tsipis, Land-based IntercontinentalBallistic Missiles, Sci. AM., Nov.
1979, at 51 [hereinafter cited as Feld & Tsipis].
12. Id. at 58.
13. See Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces 19 (Apr. 6, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Scowcroft Commission Report]; N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1982, at Al,
col. 6.

N.Y.L.

SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 4

an offensive first-strike capability against Soviet ICBM silos, which
constitute about 72% of their strategic nuclear forces." Because of this
imbalance in comparison to the American triad, the land-based MX
will create a "vulnerability" problem for the Soviets that is far more
serious and threatening than the so-called "window of vulnerability"
alleged to be facing United States ICBMs by such groups as the Committee on the Present Danger.15 The Soviets will be forced to respond
by deploying a fully mobile "light" ICBM system of their own in order
to counter the United States MX threat. Mutual deployment of one
"light" ICBM system by each superpower, as permitted by SALT 11, ' 6
will complete the first stage in the post-SALT II nuclear arms race. An
even more disturbing prospect is that the United States first-strike
MX missile might, in the alternative, force the Soviets to adopt a
"launch on warning" policy 17 that places the future of the world community at the mercy of inherently defective computers and predictably
faulty standard military operating procedures.
The next unfortunate event that contributed to the "death" of
SALT II was President Carter's self-induced fiasco over the so-called
Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba. At that particular time, the fate of
SALT II hung by a thread in the Senate. As pressure rose on Carter to
redress the nonexistent Soviet military threat to Latin America and
the Caribbean emanating from Cuba, the President finally declared
that the status quo in Cuba was "unacceptable." 18 Presumably, the Soviets should have either removed their combat troops from Cuba, or
else eliminated their allegedly offensive military capabilities. When the
Soviets refused to budge, the President had to accept what was previously unacceptable. Yet, these events proved calamitous for SALT II's
chances in the Senate. Senator Frank Church, then Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, which was still conducting hearings on
the treaty, formally "linked" its ratification to Carter achieving a
change in the Cuban status quo.
President Carter bears significant responsibility for Church's join14.

See SIPRI, supra note 3.

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, Is AMERICA BECOMING NUMBER 2? (Oct. 5,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Committee on the Present Danger]. See generally Barnet,
The Search for National Security, NEW YORKER, Apr. 27, 1981, at 50.
16. SALT II, art. 4, para. 9, supra note 8, at 39. The Scowcroft Commission Report
readily concedes that its proposed Midgetman mobile missile would violate this provision
of SALT II. See Scowcroft Commission Report, supra note 13, at 24.
17. Mohr, A Scary Debate Over 'Launch Under Attack', N.Y. Times, July 18, 1982,
at B4, col. 1.
18. See Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1979, at A8, col. 1. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT POLICY No. 93, BACKGROUND ON THE QUESTION OF
SoviET TROOPS IN CUBA (1979); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1979, at A8,col. 1.
15.
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ing of this "linkage" even though Carter publicly opposed it. 9 When
intelligence sources confirmed that Soviet combat troops were stationed in Cuba, President Carter was about to begin a vacation aboard
the Delta Queen, slowly paddle-wheeling down the Mississippi River to
provide some excellent "photo-opportunities" for his soon to be
launched Democratic Presidential primary campaign. With Carter's
knowledge, Secretary Vance directed the State Department to reveal
the information to Senator Church, apparently with the intention that
Church would have the privilege of being the first to make the information public. This would give Church an opportunity to appear to be
a hard-liner on defense matters at the start of a difficult reelection
campaign against vigorous conservative opposition, made more difficult
in part by his liberal image on foreign affairs. Presumably, a tough
stand on the Soviet troops in Cuba would permit Senator Church to
take the "soft" stand of supporting SALT II, which he favored. But
the plot boomeranged on Carter, much to his inexcusable surprise.
Church called for vigorous counteractive measures by the Carter administration, and backed up his demands with the "linkage" to SALT
II. At the request of Church, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
adopted a declaration that Carter could not ratify SALT II until he
had assured the Senate that the Soviet troops in Cuba "are not engaged in a combat role."'2 0 Out of deference to Church, the White
House acquiesced in this publicly acknowledged instance of "linkage."
All this posturing was to no avail, however, for Church, like Carter, was
defeated in his bid for reelection in November 1980.21
Of course "linkage" was a concept pioneered by Henry Kissinger
during the Nixon and Ford administrations.2 The theory stemmed in
part from his inability to perceive that strategic arms limitation agreements between the two nuclear superpowers transcend any Machiavellian maneuvers on the geopolitical chessboard of power politics.
"Linkage" is a tool of power politics, not of international law and organizations. Predictably, therefore, linking SALT II with the Soviet
"combat brigade" in Cuba proved disastrous for the future of arms
control agreements between the two nuclear superpowers.
Carter's gross mismanagement of what should have been a Cuban
19. See generally N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1979, § 1, at 26, col. 1; id., Aug. 31, 1979, at
A2, col. 3; id., Sept. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id., Sept. 10, 1979, at Al, col. 6; id., Sept. 13,
1979, at A16, col. 4; id., Nov. 3, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
20. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SALT II TREATY MARKUP: Category I
Understanding on Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1979).
21. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1980, at A19, col. 3.
22. H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 129-30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
KISSINGER].
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non-crisis provided critics with additional evidence of his basic incompetence in foreign affairs and defense policy. Before uttering any hasty
pronouncements on Soviet troops in Cuba while SALT II teetered in
the balance, Carter should have waited for the production of further
intelligence information. This eventually confirmed that such troops
had been stationed in Cuba with the full knowledge of previous American administrations23 as part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement
which terminated the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. As publicly
proclaimed, the heart of this deal was that the Soviets would remove
their medium and intermediate range ballistic missile installations and
jet bombers from Cuba in return for a United States pledge not to
24
invade that country overtly or covertly as in the Bay of Pigs incident.
Soviet conventional troops remained in Cuba in order to secure the
pledge. They served as a "trip-wire" against American invasion, makwould immediately escaing it likely that any outright assault on Cuba
2
late into a direct superpower confrontation. 1
From the Soviet perspective, it was Carter, not they, who tried to
reverse the status quo in Cuba by reneging on the KennedyKhrushchev agreement. It reasonably appeared to the Soviets that the
United States government was using the threat of SALT II's non-ratification as a geopolitical club to force them into granting unjustified and
humiliating concessions over Cuba that would undermine their position
of influence throughout the world. Hence, the Soviets understandably
refused to capitulate to Carter's demands, and he had to content himan acceptance of
self with face-saving countermeasures tantamount to
26
Cuba.
in
quo
status
"unacceptable"
previously
the
The "Soviet troops" fiasco could have been written off to routine
Presidential electoral posturing if not for the fact that this experience
inflicted irreparable damage upon SALT II. This exercise in "linkage"
must have induced any optimists in the Soviet leadership to doubt seriously the sincerity of Carter's commitment to SALT II and detente.
Kremlin pessimists must have concluded that Carter was somehow trying to trick them out of the mutual benefits promised by the SALT II
Treaty just signed at Vienna in June.
It is not surprising that another grievous blow to the life of the
treaty was perpetrated by the progenitor of both SALT II and
"linkage": Henry Kissinger. During the Nixon and Ford administraBundy, The Brigade's My Fault, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979, at A23, col. 2.
2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWFNFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 112049 (1969).
25. Weiss, Taking Salami Slices in Cuba, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1979, at 20, col. 4.
26. See DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1979, at 7.
23.

24.
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tions, Kissinger was the master architect of the policy of dtente,27 the
centerpiece of which was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).
A substantial portion of SALT II (approximately 75%) had been negotiated under his personal direction.2 8 By late summer 1979, however,
Kissinger was primarily concerned with positioning himself for re-appointment as Secretary of State in a new Republican administration.
Except for John Anderson, all the major Republican Presidential aspirants opposed ratification of SALT II, and it was clear that whoever
the candidate was going to be, a frontal assault upon the treaty would
constitute a major component of the Republican party's strategy to defeat President Carter in the 1980 election. Kissinger could not have
hoped to win another coveted term at State if he publicly and unequivocally supported SALT II. Consequently, Kissinger's testimony on the
treaty before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 31,
1979 9 became a remarkable exercise in dissimulation and obfuscation
of a matter concerning the vital national security interests of the
United States and the fate of the entire world. At the hearings, Kissinger conditioned his tepid support of SALT II on, inter alia, a significant arms buildup and the Senate's imposition of debilitating restrictions80 on the ability of the President to engage in future strategic
arms negotiations. Undoubtedly, Kissinger would have castigated the
latter as a dangerous and unconstitutional infringement upon the President's power to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, had
he been in office.
Kissinger's lukewarm and highly qualified support for SALT II
was so evanescent as to be meaningless, and his testimony proved so
innocuous that it alone could not have seriously jeopardized whatever
his reappointment prospects were without it. Yet Kissinger's self-interested refusal to speak out clearly, unequivocally and forcefully in order
to save his own progeny during the Senate hearings and throughout
the course of the public debate over the ratification of SALT II, substantially contributed to the "death" of the treaty. Indeed, about
fifteen months later, immediately before the 1980 Presidential election
on November 4, Kissinger publicly supported candidate Ronald Reagan's proposal to withdraw SALT II from consideration by the Senate
and to move directly into negotiations for SALT 111.1 Almost one year
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See generally KISSINGER, supra note 22, at 132, 949, 964, 966, 1117, 1143, 1255-57.
See supra note 1.
Id. at 151-233.
Id. at 159-60.
See Kissinger Supports Reagan on SALT, 130 DEF. DAILY 256 (1980). See generally Kissinger Urges Reappraisal of SALT 2 Provisions, 113 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 3, 1980, at 28.
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later, however, by the summer of 1982, Kissinger veered into the exact
opposite direction by publicly advocating the ratification of SALT II!31
Kissinger's venal posturing on the ratification of SALT II has been so
highly opportunistic and unprincipled that the American people should
deem him to be permanently estopped from ever again offering his
pseudo-Machiavellian advice on the proper conduct of United States
foreign policy.
The final assault on SALT II came on December 12, 1979, when
NATO announced its decision to deploy 108 Pershing 2 rockets and
464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe starting in 1983, allegedly for the purpose of offsetting the deployment of Soviet SS-20s. ss
Yet, alternatively, the deployment of fast and highly accurate American Pershing 2s in West Germany could also provide the United States
with a seemingly effective, "surprise" offensive, first-strike capability
against strategic ICBM silos targeted against the American heartland
that are located within the Soviet Union itself.34 From the Politburo's
perspective, this decision purportedly concerning only the "modernization" of theater nuclear forces (TNF), substantially undermined the
value of the SALT II limitations on the American strategic nuclear
weapons force. On its face, NATO's TNF decision specifically violated
article XII of the SALT II Treaty, providing that "each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any
other state or states, or in any other manner."" In a statement to the
North Atlantic Council on June 29, 1979, the United States government stated its unilateral opinion that "the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation
36
with its allies nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization."
With good cause the Soviet government emphatically rejected this selfserving interpretation of the non-circumvention clause of the just
signed, yet unratified SALT II Treaty.17 By its sponsorship of and par32. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and the Peace Movement, WASH. Q., Summer 1982,
at 31, 37-38.
33. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1979, at A3, col. 1. See Lewis, Intermediate Range Nuclear
Weapons, Sci. AM., Dec. 1980, at 63-73.
34. Moore, Theatre Nuclear Forces, 14 INT'L DEF. REV. 401, 407 (1981) (Pershing 2
missile can readily be given 4000 km range and be MIRVed, however, this Pershing 2
variation is not presently funded); Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 16, 1982, at 4, col. 1
(The Pentagon wanted an extra 108 Pershing 2s in West Germany as "spares," but West
Germany's Defense Minister Manfred Woerner rejected the proposal); Getler, Pershing
II Missile: Why It Alarms Soviets, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1982, at A17, col. 2.
35. SALT II, supra note 8, at 43.
36. U.S. Statement to the North Atlantic Council, June 29, 1979, reprinted in Dm,'T
ST. BULL., Aug. 1979, at 36 (emphasis added).
37. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at A7, col. 1.
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ticipation in NATO's 1979 TNF decision, the United States government willfully violated the basic rule of customary international law
enunciated in article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty . . .
until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty. .."38
Finally, NATO's 1979 TNF decision also reneged upon an unpublicized yet crucial element of the bargain struck between Kennedy and
Khrushchev to terminate the 1962 Cuban missiles crisis: Soviet offensive nuclear weapons systems were withdrawn from Cuba in an implicit
exchange for the removal of United States Jupiter missiles from Italy
and Turkey, both NATO members." Thereafter, the Soviets had a perfectly legitimate and reasonable expectation that American Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) such as the Pershing 2 would not
be reintroduced into Europe. President Brezhnev's subsequent reactive
threat to take retaliatory measures that would place the United States
"in an analogous position" 4 if NATO's new Euromissiles are deployed,
raises the specter of another Cuban missile crisis. The circumstances
now, in an era of nuclear equality, are far less auspicious for the United
States than they were in the halcyon days of American nuclear superiority. The planned deployment of Pershing 2s in West Germany will
definitely not constitute a "modernization" of NATO's theater nuclear
forces, but rather the creation of a new and destabilizing United States
IRBM first-strike counterforce system in Europe.
In any event, the timing and accumulation of such major nuclear
weapons decisions, coupled with the Soviet "combat brigade" fiasco
and the proposed trip of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to China,
undercut the credibility of the United States government with the Soviet Union in regard to arms control and detente. With SALT II effectively "dead" in the Senate, the MX missile very much alive, new
IRBMs on the way for NATO, a flowering American military rapprochement with the PRC, a massive United States military buildup in
the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean in response to the
Iranian hostage crisis and intimations that the United States might invade Iran and replace Ayatollah Khomeini with another American surrogate under the pretext of the crisis, the Soviets were given every incentive and confronted with no deterrent to violate the so-called "code
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
[1980] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmd. 7964) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969).
39. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
40. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1982, at A6, col. 2.
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of dtente"' by invading Afghanistan. There was neither "carrot" nor
"stick" for the United States to offer or wield in an effort to forestall
this aggression. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led President
Carter to withdraw SALT II from consideration by the Senate, and the
centerpiece of the Carter administration's foreign policy towards the
Soviet Union collapsed. In Afghanistan, the Soviets turned America's
specter of "linkage" upon its perverted head.
At that point, the vituperative rhetoric of the 1980 Presidential
campaign intervened and still obscures several points about SALT II
that are crucial for ensuring the future progress of nuclear arms control
and reduction agreements between the two superpowers. The Carter
administration's constant refrain that all the SALT II restrictions applied to the Soviet Union, and none to the United States," constituted
pure electoral propaganda. The SALT II Treaty per se never was a
truly effective and meaningful arms control measure. It placed no real
restrictions on either side, but left both superpowers essentially free to
build all their currently planned weapons systems.4" For example, the
then Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
David Jones, forthrightly admitted during his testimony on SALT II
that the treaty would not impede the United States nuclear weapons
program to any significant extent.4 4 Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown testified to the same effect."' Both countries agreed to limit the
number of MIRVs per missile that, in any case, they would not be
technologically able to exceed until after the expiration of SALT II in
1985. The Soviets agreed to dismantle obsolete weapons systems that
had already been scheduled to be replaced. The freeze on the number
of Soviet "heavy" SS-18s at 308 did not matter much since that figure
seems to have represented their planned deployment run of "heavy"
ICBMs in the first place, and was simply carried forward from the
SALT I Interim Agreement of 197246 and the Vladivostok Accord.
Rather than constructing more "vulnerable" SS-18 silos, the Soviets
now seem to be interested in deploying a mobile "light" ICBM system
as permitted by SALT II. In this regard, there are reports that the
Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations, United States-U.S.S.R., May 29,
11 I.L.M. 756 (1972).
See, e.g., Warnke, Remarks, 74 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 212, 213 (1980).
See 39 CONG. Q. 177 (1981).
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 72A, SENATE TESTIMONY OF GENERAL JONES ON SALT II 33, 35-36 (July 9-11, 1979).
45. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 72A, SEN41.
1972,
42.
43.
44.

ATE TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY BROWN ON

SALT II 9, 15 (July 9-11, 1979).

46. Interim Agreement and Protocol with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United States-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
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Soviets are now testing the deployment of a mobile "light" ICBM system on railroad cars.
SALT II possessed little more than symbolic significance without a
SALT III and SALT IV. Yet, the great value of SALT II was that it
could have paved the way for successful SALT III negotiations concerning theater nuclear forces in Europe and for genuine future arms
reduction agreements between the two nuclear superpowers and their
allies. Also, there was always the likelihood that SALT II could have
been informally extended by the two superpowers after its expiration
in 1985, much as they have done with the SALT I Interim Agreement. " ' At that point, the SALT II numerical restrictions could begin
to serve as an effective limitation on the development of both United
States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons systems.
The value of SALT lies less in the limitations formally set out in
each treaty, than in the process of negotiation itself. The technology of
mass destruction develops too rapidly for the cumbersome, time-consuming and highly politicized treaty negotiation and ratification procedures to control. The SALT process cannot stop and reverse the arms
race until it first controls the technology race. In the meantime, however, continuation of the SALT process serves the useful function of
purporting to regulate technological evolution in the nuclear arms race.
SALT makes the arms race appear more understandable, predictable,
less irrational and thus susceptible to governmental control. Undoubtedly, these appearances are illusions that could someday become suicidal for mankind. But since nuclear deterrence is essentially a psychological phenomenon, in the absence of genuine arms reductions, such
illusions make the strategic balance of terror between the two superpowers appear more stable and, therefore, less dangerous than would
be the case without them.
On the other hand, charges that SALT II somehow undermined
the very foundation of Western strategic nuclear deterrence, by groups
such as the Committee on the Present Danger (COPD)48 and, later,
under its influence, the Reagan campaign, were without any merit
whatsoever.4 9 However, since the COPD's strategic nuclear assumptions, such as the "window of vulnerability," dominate the defense and
47. See 1 M. GLENNON
MENTS AND SOURCES 41-59

& T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: Docu(1980) (excerpt, Senate Debate on Senate Concurrent Resolution 56 concerning the informal extension of SALT I).
48. See generally COMMITrEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, supra note 15, at 15-21.
49. See, e.g., Lens, A-Bomb Almanac, NATION, Apr. 4, 1981, at 389 (listing U.S. nuclear capabilities and liabilities); Metcalf, Missile Accuracy-The Need to Know, 9
STRATEGIC REV. 5 (1981). See generally Wicker, Rethinking the MX(2), N.Y. Times,
Aug. 28, 1981, at A23, col. 5.
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foreign policies of the Reagan administration, they must be seriously
reexamined and ultimately repudiated. The COPD's outlandish assumptions do not justify the enormous nuclear and conventional weapons buildup currently proposed by the Reagan administration, which,
it quite callously admits, will be financed directly by huge cuts from
scarce resources previously allocated to social welfare programs and
human services. Nothing could constitute a greater present danger to
the peace, stability, security and prosperity of the United States, both
at home and abroad, than this wasteful and unnecessary arms buildup
America is now experiencing under the misguided stewardship of those
COPD members who have assumed high governmental positions in the
Reagan administration.
The COPD concept of a "window of vulnerability" is a lot of nonsense. It is based on the dubious assumption that the Soviets can and
will arm each of their 308 SS-18s with 40 reentry vehicles (RVs), each
possessing enough pinpoint accuracy to take out hardened United
States ICBM silos.5" The Soviets neither have nor will have the capability to arm an SS-18 with more than 10 RVs, each with enough accuracy to destroy silos, nor do they aspire to have this technology, even
assuming it is possible. 1 As the number of RVs and their accompanying decoys and penetration aids per missile increases, beyond a certain
point the accuracy of each RV would necessarily decrease. Indeed, if
SALT II had been duly ratified in 1979, Soviet SS-18s would have been
limited to 10 RVs each; the SS-17, to 4 RVs; the SS-19, to 6 RVs; the
new "light" ICMB 52 permitted by SALT II, to 10 RVs; SLBMs, to 14
RVs; and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) to 10 RVs. 5s The
Soviet's long-range mobile SS-16 was banned altogether by SALT II
because its first two stages are indistinguishable from the intermediate-range SS-20." So those Reagan administration officials currently
decrying intelligence indications that the Soviets are now deploying
SS-16s have only themselves to blame for opposing the ratification of
SALT 11. 5
Article III of SALT II would have carried forward Vladivostok's
equal overall aggregate ceiling of 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
50. 1 Military Posture: Hearings Before the House Committee on Armed Services,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1121 (1979) (testimony of Paul Nitze).

51.

See

NEWSWEEK,

Jan. 31, 1983, at 20.

52. SALT II, art. 4, para. 9, supra note 8, at 39 ("Each party undertakes not to flighttest or deploy new types of ICBM's, that is types of ICBM's not flight-tested as of May
1, 1979 except that each party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.").
53. SALT I, art. 4, paras. 10-13, supra note 8, at 39-40.
54. SALT II, art. 4, para. 8, supra note 8, at 39.
55. N.Y. Post, Apr. 3, 1982, at 2.
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launchers for both sides, and would have required the Soviet Union to
reduce that number to 2250 by January 1, 1981." Article V of SALT II
contained the Vladivostok sublimit of 1320 for all MIRVed systems.
Within that number, it established a sublimit of 1200 on launchers of
MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs and MIRVed ASBMs; and within
that number it established a sublimit of 820 on MIRVed ICBMs. 7
Likewise, if SALT II had been ratified in 1979, Soviet production of
the Backfire bomber would have been limited to thirty per year under
the terms of a separate but related statement by Brezhnev." These
SALT II limitations would have decisively impeded the ability of the
Soviet Union to exploit the throw-weight advantage of their heavier
ICBMs by the process of additional MIRVing, which was the primary
concern of the COPD. Indeed, an indefinite extension of the life of a
ratified SALT II Treaty beyond its contemplated 1985 expiration date
could permanently forestall the development of any hypothetical "window of vulnerability" for both the United States and the Soviet landbased ICBM systems.
Even assuming the worst case scenario envisioned by the COPD,
that towards the end of this decade the Soviets will have acquired the
necessary technological sophistication to quadruple the number of RVs
per SS-18 and to design each one of these 12,230 reentry vehicles with
the degree of computer-simulated "accuracy" to destroy hardened
United States ICBM silos, the COPD's assertion that there would then
exist a "window of vulnerability" for the United States Minuteman
ICBM force is still a lot of strategic nonsense. The COPD maintains
that under these circumstances the Soviets will be able to launch a
"disarming" surprise first-strike upon the great bulk of United States
ICBM silos by means of using only a portion of their own ICBM force,
while holding the remainder of their ICBMs in reserve for a threatened
second-strike upon United States population centers." Presumably the
Politburo would then issue an ultimatum to the American President
that he either surrender or face the total annihilation of the United
States population by the rest of the Soviet ICBM force. Consequently,
according to the COPD, the President would be presented with only
two unpalatable options: (1) ordering an all-out nuclear attack upon
Soviet population centers by America's unscathed SLBM force with
full knowledge that this action would precipitate Soviet destruction of
American cities by left-over Soviet ICBMs and other strategic nuclear
56. SALT II, supra note 8, at 38.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 73.
59.

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, supra note 15, at 20.
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forces; or (2) capitulating. Shorn of his own ICBMs, the President
would be incapable of pursuing a third and more rational alternative of
ordering a limited nuclear strike on the remaining Soviet ICBM force60
because American SLBMs do not possess the pinpoint accuracy necessary to be used in a countersilo as opposed to a countercity mode.
The COPD fears that without the availability of this third option,
any sane, intelligent and "moral" American President might choose to
surrender rather than proceed any farther down the path towards nuclear Armageddon. Hence the COPD posits the need to close this "window of vulnerability" by generating such a third option: to launch a
limited nuclear strike on reserve Soviet ICBM silos by proceeding immediately with the deployment of a force of "survivable" United States
ICBMs. 6 1 Originally, the Reagan administration had interpreted this
requirement to mean the deployment of the new MX missile into a
land-based mode that can "absorb" a Soviet first-strike with enough
missiles left intact in order to destroy any remaining Soviet ICBMs.
I will not spend much time examining in great detail the absurd
nature of this interconnected set of improbable assumptions underlying the COPD's worst case scenario because there exists at least one
definitive line of refutation that can be quickly explained and readily
comprehended. As Carter's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown indicated during his testimony on SALT II before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in the summer of 1979, even under the worst case
scenario envisioned by the COPD, the President of the United States
would still be able to implement that third alternative of ordering a
limited nuclear strike on any reserve Soviet ICBM forces by means of
American B-52 bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) that do possess enough accuracy to be used in a countersilo
capacity and that can penetrate Soviet air defenses. Admittedly, the
bomber/ALCM attack would take eight to ten hours to complete,
whereas a United States MX counterstrike could theoretically occur in
only thirty minutes to an hour, assuming the best of circumstances. 62
But this short time differential does not validate the limited nuclear
war assumptions of the COPD's worst case scenario.
During those eight to ten hours, the United States President could
simply sit tight while the bombers/ALCMs fly to the outskirts of Soviet airspace in order to perform their mission of destroying any
residual ICBM force. With the bombers/ALCMs on their way, the next
move in the COPD's hypothetical scenario for limited nuclear war
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 35.
Feld & Tsipis, supra note 11, at 51.
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would be up to the Soviet Union. During those eight to ten hours, the
Soviet leadership would be confronted with three basic options,
presented here in an estimated increasing order of probability: (1) absorb the United States bomber/ALCM attack and then do nothing; (2)
absorb the United States bomber/ALCM attack and then launch the
rest of their strategic nuclear forces upon American population centers;
and (3) launch any remaining ICBMs together with the rest of their
strategic nuclear forces upon American population centers before the
United States bombers/ALCMs arrive. In the event the Soviet leadership decides upon alternatives 2 or 3, the United States President
could still effectively retaliate by ordering the destruction of Soviet cities by means of the intact United States SLBM force. Yet, given the
enormous uncertanties underlying all these outlandish scenarios for
waging a limited nuclear war, in the most improbable event that the
Soviet Politburo someday decides to launch a surprise nuclear attack
upon the continental United States, it would most likely order a simultaneous and coordinated all-out assault by the entirety of their strategic nuclear weapons systems upon American population centers, industrial complexes, ICBM silos, in-port SLBM forces (40%)"3 and SAC
bomber bases. In that event, an American President could still totally
devastate the Soviet Union by means of America's invulnerable at-sea
SLBM force (60%)" alone, or in conjunction with United States quick
alert bombers.
The need to guarantee this outcome of "mutual assured destruction" for both superpowers under a variety of such worst case scenarios
had already been foreseen and exploited by previous American administrations to justify construction of the redundant "triad" dispersement
of United States strategic nuclear weapons systems among bombers,
SLBMs and ICBMs in the first place. Indeed, after the passage of over
two years into the Reagan administration, the Scowcroft Commission
Report, enthusiastically endorsed by President Reagan, definitively
closed this mythical "window of vulnerability" by arguing quite persuasively that the COPD's scenario for a "successful" Soviet limited
nuclear attack upon the United States Minuteman ICBM force was
never a realistic possibility, precisely because of the existence of the
"triad." Despite the outrageous claims of the Committee on the Present Danger and, under its influence, by the Reagan administration,
there is absolutely no need to make the triad any more redundant than
it already is by deploying a first-strike MX missile system in order to
63. See generally COMMITTEE

ON THE PRESENT DANGER, THE U.S.-SovIET MILITARY

BALANCE AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

64.

Id.

(1982).
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close a non-existent "window of vulnerability" allegedly threatening
the current United States Minuteman ICBM force.
If the Reagan administration was in fact seriously concerned about
the existence of some such theoretical "window of vulnerability," it
would not have stridently advocated the admittedly vulnerable basing
mode known as the "dense-pack" for the MX missile. From the
COPD's strategic nuclear perspective, the dense-pack was far less
survivable than the Carter administration's racetrack/dragstrip proposal. Moreover, Pentagon devotees of the dense-pack and, before it, of
the racetrack/dragstrip have tacitly conceded that ultimately such
fixed or semi-fixed basing modes for the MX missile would require the
deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense in order finally
to solve the hypothetical "vulnerability" problem. 65 This of course assumes that the United States can indeed develop and deploy an effective ABM system in the first place. If that is the case, however, it
would make more sense to have abrogated the ABM Treaty 0 when it
came up for review in 1982 (or again in 1987) so as to deploy an ABM
defense around the entire United States Minuteman ICBM system as
soon as feasible, and thus abandon the multibillion dollar first-strike
and destabilizing MX missile. Apparently, the Pentagon is more concerned with the acquisition of a potentially disarming first-strike missile against Soviet ICBMs than it is with closing some non-existent
"window of vulnerability" for United States ICBMs.
Furthermore, from the COPD's strategic nuclear perspective, both
the dense-pack and the racetrack/dragstrip basing modes would be far
less effective in terms of closing the "window of vulnerability" than the
deployment of the MX missile on railroad cars that can shuttle across
the continental United States on its extensive railway infrastructure-a system the Soviet Union now seems to be experimenting with
for its new mobile "light" ICBM. Although a United States "railway"
or "roadway" MX has the advantage that it would not require an ABM
defense, the problem with a fully mobile land basing mode (such as the
Scowcroft Commission's suggested "Midgetman") is that if it is
adopted by either one or both superpowers, it might not be adequately
verifiable for the purpose of negotiating future arms control and reduc65.

See Robinson, Layered Defense System Pushed to Protect ICBMs,

AVIATION

WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 9, 1981, at 83 (discusses proposed strategic advantages in

deploying a low-altitude defense system to protect ICBMs); Quirt, Washington's New
Push for Anti-Missiles, FORTUNE, Oct. 19, 1981, at 142.
66. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, United
States-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, modified by Protocol,
July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
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tion agreements s7 Assuming the Reagan administration really possesses a serious commitment to that objective, the interplay of these
considerations leads inevitably to the Garwin-Drell proposal of basing
the MX in offshore diesel powered submarines cruising somewhere
above the United States continental shelf. 8 The Garwin-Drell proposal
would be cheaper, more capable of surviving a Soviet first-strike, would
not require any ABM defense, could be adequately verified and would
not create any domestic political or environmental problems. If the
MX missile is ultimately deployed, as the Reagan administration
seems determined to do, it should be placed under the ocean, not on
the land. The primary reason why this solution to the nonexistent
"vulnerability" problem has not been adopted by either the Carter or
Reagan administrations is better explained in terms of bureaucratic
politics within the Pentagon than by strategic, economic, environmental or arms control considerations: The Air Force does not want to lose
the MX to the Navy.
Or to phrase this proposition in a more precise manner, the Navy
is currently engaged in the process of deploying an offensive first-strike
strategic nuclear weapons system by means of its Trident 2 program.6s
Each Trident 2 missile will be armed with fourteen Delta-5 warheads,
each possessing enough pinpoint accuracy to destroy hardened Soviet
ICBM silos and thus to be used in a counterforce as- opposed to the
traditional SLBM countercity mode.70 Thus, with the explicit approval
and active support of both the Carter and Reagan administrations, the
Pentagon has been proceeding apace with the design, testing and deployment of three separate and independent potentially offensive firststrike counterforce nuclear weapons systems: the Air Force's MX, the
Navy's Trident 2 and the Army's Pershing 2. To this formidable arsenal should also be added the new MK12A warhead for the MIRVed (3
RVs) Minuteman III ICBM system that can also exercise a substantial
countersilo capability.7 This is an astounding and truly disturbing situation! I am confident the Soviet leadership cannot even begin to comprehend why the United States government would want to field four
offensive first-strike nuclear weapons systems at the same time if the
Reagan administration actually possesses a genuine commitment to the
67. Snow, MX: Maginot Line of the 1980's, 36 BULL. ATOM. ScL, Nov. 1980, at 21, 2425.
68. Feld & Tsipis, supra note 11, at 60. Cf. Scowcroft Commission Report, supra note
13, at 11, 20 (a balanced strategic force would include bomber and air-launched cruise
missiles together with the submarine ballistic missiles).
69. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1981, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
70. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
71. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1982, at A21, col. 3.
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negotiation of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with
them. Based upon all the evidence so far available, the most likely and
logical conclusion for the Politburo to draw is that the Reagan administration has been exploiting the American public's paranoid fear over
the COPD's worst case scenario for a defensive limited nuclear war
(i.e., "the window of vulnerability") in order to obtain the popular support for the expenditure of funds necessary to construct new weapons
systems that will provide the United States government with the theoretical capability to wage a "successful" offensive limited nuclear war
against Soviet ICBMS.
The American government's completion of its planned deployment
of the MK12A, MX, Trident 2, and Pershing 2 systems near the end of
this decade will effectively reverse the respective positions of the two
superpowers in the COPD's hypothetical worst case scenario for a limited nuclear war. The net result, though, is that the "window of vulnerability" then facing the Soviet Union will be far more tangible and
dangerous because of its preponderant reliance on ICBMs. At that
point, the Politburo's adoption of a launch on warning policy becomes
a real possibility, if not an inevitability. The United States government
will then feel compelled to respond in kind. The mutual adoption of
launch on warning policies by both nuclear superpowers would then
create an enormous, almost inexorable incentive for either one to
launch a preemptive first-strike on the other with part or all of their
nuclear weapons systems, in the event a serious geopolitical crisis
breaks out between them.
I sincerely hope that the United States government would never
give serious consideration to launching a surprise nuclear attack upon
the Soviet Union for any reason. 72 Yet, based upon the foremost Armageddon-like experience the world has witnessed in nuclear crisis management decision-making between the two superpowers, I am not
overly confident that the United States would not consider the option
of a surprise attack. At the onset of the Cuban missile crisis in October
of 1962, a substantial majority of the members of the United States
governmental decision-making team established to handle the matter
(the "Executive Committee") believed that a "surprise surgical air
strike" against Soviet missile sites and bombers in Cuba was the only
viable course of conduct tp take in response to Khrushchev's surrepti72. But see Anderson, A Small Step For Man From The First Strike, Wash. Post,
Apr. 19, 1983, E8, col. 3 (MX missile and Minuteman are first strike weapons, not just
first strike deterrents; however, since MX numbers have been reduced, their use as
weapons is unlikely); Anderson, Missile Worrier Gets Heave-Ho From Air Force, Wash.
Post, Mar. 16, 1983, at D.C. 13, col. 3 (U.S.A.F. teaches first strike in its missile training

class).

19831

ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION

tious placement of these extraordinarily dangerous and threatening
weapons a short distance off the coast of the continental United
States. 78 Notification of a bombardment to Krushchev or Castro prior
to its commencement was ruled out "for military or other reasons." 7'
Upon hearing general support for launching a surprise attack during the initial deliberations of the Executive Committee, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy passed a note to his brother, the President,
that said: "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor."75 Robert Kennedy adamantly opposed such a "sneak attack" because it was entirely inconsistent with the moral values upon which the
United States of America was supposed to be founded. 71 Primarily for
this reason, Robert Kennedy decided to join ranks with Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara in advocating the imposition of a naval
blockade around Cuba, followed by United States
resort to the Organi77
endorsement.
its
for
States
American
of
zation
One major advantage a blockade had over a surprise attack was
that the former would permit the United States to present a plausible
legal justification for its conduct before the Organization of American
States and the United Nations in a bid to obtain, respectively, their
support for or lack of opposition to United States action, while a sneak
attack would have been legally indefensible before any international
forum.7 8 Eventually, the blockade alternative prevailed over the surprise attack scenario, and the United States did receive the unanimous
support of the O.A.S. for its "quarantine" of Cuba.7 9 In the opinion of
Robert Kennedy, "[tihe strongest argument against the all-out military
attack, and one no one could answer to his satisfaction, was that a surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral position of the
United States throughout the world."8
I can only hope that some future American President under similarly excruciating crisis conditions would likewise have the patience,
courage and foresight to override the advice given by a majority of his
top advisers and refuse to order an illegal "surprise surgical airstrike"
upon Soviet ICBM silos by first-strike counterforce strategic nuclear
73. See R. KRNNcDy, THRTmN DAYS 9 (1971).
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 15-17. "We spent more time on this moral question during the first five
days than on any other single matter .... We struggled and fought with one another
and with our consciences, for it was a question that deeply troubled us all." Id. at 17.
77. Id. at 12, 15.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 26-27, 35.

80. Id. at 27.
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weapons systems such as the MK12A, MX, Trident 2 and Pershing 2.
Nevertheless, to provide an American President with the military option of ordering an illegal offensive "surprise limited nuclear attack"
upon Soviet ICBM silos by the prior deployment of the MK12A, MX,
Trident 2 and Pershing 2, only makes it that much more likely that
these systems will in fact someday be so used. As Robert Kennedy is
reported to have said in regard to the members of the Executive Committee during the Cuban missile crisis: "The fourteen people involved
were very significant .... If six of them had been President of the
U.S., I think that the world might have been blown up."8 1 Because
there does not exist such a phenomenon commonly called the "window
of vulnerability," these inherently offensive systems cannot serve any
conceivable defensive or deterrent purpose, and they are certainly not
necessary for a retaliatory attack upon Soviet population centers.
There is, thus, no legitimate reason under international law for the
United States government to develop and deploy any one of these offensive strategic nuclear weapons systems, let alone all four
simultaneously.
To forestall the development of such a predicament, on November
5, 1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan should have announced that
immediately upon assumption of office, his administration intended to
enter into the proposed SALT III negotiations concerning the "modernization" of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe: SS-20's, the
Pershing 2, ground-launched cruise missiles, the neutron bomb, the
Backfire bomber and United States Forward Based Systems (FBS).
The Reagan administration finally did this in November of 1981, but
that was after it wasted almost ten precious months before starting
negotiations. 82 In my reading of the proposals put forth by the Reagan
administration on TNF, I am somewhat skeptical that the United
States is really conducting these negotiations in good faith, especially
given the formative roles played in the development of the United
States position by Eugene Rostow, former head of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and Paul Nitze, the chief SALT III negotiator, both of whom were leading members of the Committee on the Present Danger. I question to what extent the so-called "zero option" put
forth by Reagan is simply a sop that has been made to the people of
Western Europe in order,to get them to agree to deployment of the
Pershing 2s and ground-launched cruise missiles commencing in 1983.
Remember that NATO's TNF decision in December of 1979 was
two tracked: the new TNF would be developed, but negotiations would
81.
82.

Id. at 128.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
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occur so that they would not have to be deployed.83 I certainly have no
evidence as to negotiating positions at Geneva other than what has appeared in the public record. But from all the indications I have read,
the Reagan administration intends to arm to the teeth first, and maybe
negotiate seriously later. In this regard, President Reagan's refusal to
include consideration of United States FBS and of the French and
British nuclear forces within the TNF negotiations is especially distressing.84 The December 21, 1982 proposal by General Secretary Yuri
Andropov to reduce Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe to the number of missiles fielded by Great Britain and France
(i.e., 162) in return for NATO's abandonment of its plan to deploy the
572 medium range missiles in Europe, seems to stake out an eminently
reasonable position for the start of serious negotiations between the
two superpowers.8 5
I think the Reagan administration should have called for an immediate opening of formal negotiations concerning those strategic systems
not prohibited by SALT II, for example, the "light" ICBM, cruise missiles, high energy, anti-satellite, space-based weapons. Mankind is already caught up in this post-SALT II stage of the nuclear arms race.
The two superpowers, in conjunction with their allies, must negotiate
immediately and comprehensively to prevent the loss of all control
over the development of these weapons systems. Regrettably, the Reagan administration wasted one year of precious time by debating
whether even to participate in its proposed Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) with the Soviet Union.8
To support movement in this direction, the Reagan administration
must continue to adhere to the terms of the unratified SALT 11 Treaty.
Ultimately, the formal ratification of SALT II or of some cosmetic substitute by the United States government will be the precondition for
any progress in negotiating nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with the Soviet Union. President Carter's unfortunate experience in unexpectedly calling for massive nuclear weapons cuts on the
part of both superpowers, especially in the area of ICBMs, indicates
that the best course of action for the Reagan administration would be
to announce its support for the immediate ratification of SALT II
before the United States continues to pursue the strategic arms reduc83. Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers Communique, NATO Rav.,
Feb. 1980, at 25.
84. Eagleburger, The U.S. Approach to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces, NATO REv., Feb. 1982, at 7, 10-11; Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1983, at A12,

col. 3.
85. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
86.

Id., June 29, 1982, at A6, col. 5.
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tion talks with the Soviet Union, and then to work diligently to secure
the Republican-controlled Senate's advice and consent to the Treaty.
Future progress can only be made upon the basis of consolidating past
gains.
START will only succeed within the context of a ratified SALT II.
This can be accomplished by both superpowers agreeing to modify a
ratified SALT II by significantly lowering its numerical limitations on
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle launchers and upon an indefinite extension of the life of such a ratified treaty as so amended. The Soviet
Union has already indicated that it is prepared to proceed in this manner within the context of the START negotiations.8 7 The Russians proposed an equal ceiling for both superpowers of 1800 long-range missiles
and bombers. This would require the Soviet Union to reduce its current level of 2500 and the United States to reduce its level of 2000. In
addition, the Soviets indicated a willingness to establish an overall ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads carried by long-range missiles
and bombs carried by bombers. Furthermore, the Soviets expressed a
desire to retain "the best elements of"s8 SALT II and a readiness to
consider modifications. Yet, the Reagan administration has so far rejected their overture because it still obstinately maintains that SALT
II is in some mysterious way "fatally flawed." 89 The time has come for
the Reagan administration to abandon the rhetoric of the Reagan
campaign.
In the immediate future, the Reagan administration should officially disavow Presidential Directive 59,90 a Carter campaign fiasco, as

well as its more dangerous successor, Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger's 1982 Five-year Defense Guidance Statement,9 1 the former of which naively contemplates the possibility of fighting a "limited
nuclear war," 92 the latter "prevailing" in a "protracted nuclear war." 93
Under the pernicious influence of the Committee on the Present Danger, the United States government's basic strategic nuclear doctrine
has shifted from one of deterring nuclear war, to fighting and winning
87. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1982, at Al, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1982, at 9; L.A.
Times, Sept. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 2; Aerospace Daily, Oct. 13, 1982, at 226.
88. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,1982, at Al, col. 1.
89. See N.Y. Times, June 29, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
90. For a discussion of Presidential Directive 59, see R. SCHEER, WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH & NUCLEAR WAR 11-12 (1982).
91. For a discussion of the Five-year Defense Guidance Plan, see R. SCHEER, supra
note 90, at 8, 32. See generally Bethe, Gottfried & Currey, The Five Year War Plan,
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1982, at A31, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 30, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
92. See R. SCHEER, supra note 90.
93. Id.

1983]

ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION

a nuclear war."' This is utter folly. Consequently, the Reagan administration should make an affirmative decision against deploying any
land-based MX missile system, sea-based Trident 2 system and European-based Pershing 2 system, each of which independently possesses
a theoretical offensive first-strike capability against the Soviet ICBM
force.
President Reagan's proposals to defend a multibillion dollar landbased MX with a multibillion dollar land-based and space-base antiballistic missile system,9 5 compound one folly with another to create
strategic and economic insanity. It must be made emphatically clear to
the Soviet Union that the United States will not terminate the life of
the 1972 United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty when it comes up for review in 1987 or beyond. The Reagan administration should work assiduously toward conclusion of the partially complete Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,"
which it has now decisively repudiated. If governments cannot test nuclear weapons, it is difficult to measure their capabilities, and this uncertainty in calculations deters their offensive use. The United States
should continue to resist the further proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology and materials. In this area, the policy of the Reagan administration as it has developed seems to deemphasize the importance of
controlling nuclear proliferation and instead stresses the concept that
the United States should become a reliable supplier; that is, a reliable
proliferator9 s
Finally, the Reagan administration must repudiate its adoption of
Henry Kissinger's theory of "linkage" between considerations of geopolitical power politics, for example, events in Afghanistan, Poland and
94. The recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger are based upon
the belief that it is the policy of the Soviet Union to be prepared "for nuclear war-

fighting, war-surviving and war-winning." CoMMrrTEE

ON THE PRESENT DANGER,

supra

note 15, at 2. In its assessment of U.S. policy in the past, the Committee's report points
out that "official U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine, since at least 1974, has been based
upon a need for enduring 'war-fighting' capabilities, even for relatively protracted contingencies." Id. at 18. For an insight into the shift in U.S. policy from deterrence to
fighting and winning a nuclear war, from the 1950's to the present, see J.D. Porro, The
Policy War: Brodie v. Kahn, 38 BULL. AToM. Sci. 16 (1982).
95. In a televised speech aimed at defending a 10% increase in military spending in
1984, President Reagan appealed to modern technology to develop a program of defense
measures for the future whereby deterrence would be based not upon the Soviet Union's
fear of immediate U.S. retaliation to a nuclear attack but, rather, upon the capability of
the U.S. to "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own
soil or that of our allies." N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at A20, col. 5-6.
96. See Report on CTB Negotiations, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1980, at 47; Caldwell,
CTB: An Effective SALT Substitute, BULL. AToM. ScI., Dec. 1980, at 30.
97. Comment, Reagan Changes Course on Nonproliferation, 216 Sci. 1388 (1982).
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El Salvador, and those of nuclear weapons control. 8 Human survival
depends on the success of these endeavors to control the nuclear arms
race by the principles and techniques of international law and organizations. Handicapped, defective and imperfect they may be, but they
represent the only short-term and long-range substitutes for the increasing risk of a nuclear war.
As for so-called "linkage in fact," if the politicized treaty ratification procedure in the United States Senate proves a major obstacle to
the realization of the foregoing agenda, future administrations must
submit their arms control and reduction agreements with the Soviet
Union for approval by a joint resolution of Congress. 9 Such agreements must not be held hostage to the self-interested votes of a few
Senators. Failure by the Senate to support the Treaty of Versailles'"
and the Covenant of the League of Nations"'1 was in part responsible
for World War II. Senate obstinacy over a revised SALT II or SALT
III or START I must not be permitted to pave the way for World War
III.
On November 10, 1979, shortly after the seizure of United States
diplomats in Teheran, I visited Hans Morgenthau at his home in Manhattan. It proved to be our last conversation before his death on July
19, 1980. At the end of the discussion, I asked him what he thought
about the future of international relations:
Future, what future? I am extremely pessimistic. In my opinion the world is moving ineluctably towards a third world
war-a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything
can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply
too unstable to survive for long. The SALT II Treaty is important for the present, but over the long haul it cannot stop the
that I will live to see
momentum. Fortunately, I do not believe
2
10
that day. But I am afraid you might.

Somewhat serendipitously, George Kistiakowsky made the same
prediction three months later before an audience at Harvard
University:
98. See, e.g., Hamilton, To Link or Not to Link, FoREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1981, at 127.
See also Selin, Looking Ahead to SALT III, 5 INr'L SEcUrrY 171 (1980-81).
99. See Comment, Approval of SALT Agreements by Joint Resolution of Congress,
21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 421 (1980). See also McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congress-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National Policy (pts.
1 & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945).
100. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 188.
101. Id. at 195-205.
102. Interview with Hans Morgenthau in New York City (Nov. 10, 1979).
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I think that with the kind of political leaders we have in the
world . . . nuclear weapons will proliferate. .

.

. I personally

think that the likelihood for an initial use of nuclear warheads
is really quite great between now and the end of this century,
which is only twenty years hence. My own estimate, since I am
almost eighty years old, [is that] I will probably die from some
other cause. But looking around at all these young people [in
the audience], I am sorry to say I think a lot of you may die
from nuclear war.' °3
To the same effect have been recent public statements by George Kennan 1

4

and Hyman Rickover.10 6

It is imperative that we undertake a committed and concerted effort to disprove these predictions concerning the end of human civilization. For us to gainsay or ignore the distinct possibility, if not preponderant probability, of a global nuclear war is to engage in that classic
psychoanalytical defense mechanism known as denial.1 Far better to
think about the unthinkable and try to come to grips with it, than to
deny strategic nuclear reality and allow the unthinkable to destroy us.
Perhaps a nuclear war cannot be prevented, but at least we must attempt to do so.
The analysis of the "death" of the SALT II Treaty and the program for the future of nuclear arms control developed here cannot
serve as a general panacea for all the problems of American nuclear
weapons policy. But it does point one direction out of the self-fulfilling
prophecy of limited nuclear war propounded by the Committee on the
Present Danger and the Reagan administration. Only the political will
is needed for the United States to take the first step away from nuclear
catastrophe by ratifying SALT II.
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22 (brackets in original).
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105. See Excerpts from Farewell Testimony of Rickover to Congress, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
106. See L. WRIGHTSMAN & F. SANFORD, PSYCHOLOGY: A ScigNiic SUDv oF HuMAN
BEHAVIOR 464-65 (4th ed. 1975).

